We propose the concept of fine-grained forward-secure signature schemes. Such signature schemes not only provide non-repudiation w.r.t. past time periods the way ordinary forward-secure signature schemes do but, in addition, allow the signer to specify which signatures of the current time period remain valid when revoking the public key. This is an important advantage if the signer produces many signatures per time period as otherwise the signer would have to re-issue those signatures (and possibly re-negotiate the respective messages) with a new key.
Introduction
Ordinary digital signature schemes suffer from a fundamental shortcoming: when the public key is revoked, e.g., because the secret key got exposed, all signatures made become reputable. Therefore ordinary signature schemes by themselves can not provide non-repudiation.
One possibility to overcome this problem is to use a so-called time-stamping service. Here, each signature is sent to a trusted third party who signs a message containing the signature and the current date and time. A signature is now considered non-reputable if its time-stamp predates the time of the public-key's revocation. Hence non-repudiation is guaranteed, assuming that the secret key of the time-stamping service is never leaked. However, such a time-stamping service is likely to be a bottle-neck, in particular as running such a service is a difficult task similar to the one of running a certification authority. Hence this solution is not very desirable.
Another solution to the problem is to change the keys frequently, e.g., every day, and to delete past secret keys. It then is understood that a signature is valid if the user did not revoke the corresponding public key during the same time period she used that key.
In practice, however, the user must be allowed to revoke the key also for some while after the period has passed. This is because some time must be allowed to the user to discover key leakage and for a revocation request to be processed by the certification authority. Note that as long as the time period plus the extra time allowed has not passed one cannot be sure about a signature's nonrepudiation because a (dishonest) signer can always revoke the key to "recall" a signature. This, however, seems to be unavoidable.
Unfortunately, changing the keys frequently either requires repeated interaction with the certification authority to register the public keys or, otherwise, the public key becomes large (e.g., consists of a list of daily public keys). This drawback is overcome by forward-secure signature schemes as introduced by Anderson [1] (and formalized by Bellare and Miner [2] ). These schemes allow the users to have a different secret key for each time period but only a single (small) public key [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . In fact, most forward-secure signature schemes allow one to derive the secret key for the current period from the one of the previous period in a one-way fashion, that is, there is only a single small secret key as well.
Still, forward-secure signature schemes are not completely satisfactory as (at least) all the signatures made in the current time period become invalid when the user revokes the public key. Hence the signer needs to re-issue those signatures (and possibly re-negotiate the corresponding messages) with a new key.
One way to solve this problem is to update the secret key very frequently, e.g., every second. This is of course only feasible if the secret-key update is very efficient. This is the case for the scheme by Kozlov and Reyzin [6] and the scheme obtained from the MMM construction [5] applied to the Schnorr signature scheme [7] . Unfortunately, they both are not provably secure in the strict sense: they are only proven secure in the random oracle model [8] , which is a heuristic only (in fact, it has been proven that such oracles cannot be realized with any hash function [9, 10] ). For the known schemes that are provably secure in the strict sense, the time to update the secret key is too large for this approach to work.
In this paper we propose fine-grained forward-secure signature schemes as a better solution. The idea here is that, apart from using a new secret key for each time period, each signature carries an ascending index such that once an index is used (and the secret key updated accordingly), no signature can be made w.r.t. a lower index. Thus, whenever the secret key gets compromised, the signer can just announce the index used before the secret key got compromised.
Apart from putting forth a formal model of fine-grained forward-secure signature schemes, we also present practical schemes that are provably secure under the Strong RSA assumption. Our schemes also give rise to an ordinary forward-secure signature scheme for t time-periods, the secret-key update time of which is about a factor Ω(log t) faster than the best known schemes that are provably secure in the strict sense while the time to sign a message is essentially the same.
Recently, key-insulated signature schemes [11] and intrusion-resilient signatures [12] have been introduced. In these schemes not only past but also future secret keys remain secure in case the current secret key is compromised. Unfortunately, those solutions require the signer's communication with a safe computing device and assume that both this device and the signer's system cannot be broken into during the same time period. We stress that the schemes we propose do not require the existence of such additional devices. Nevertheless, our fine-grained techniques could be combined with key-insulated and intrusion-resilient signatures to provide them with supplementary fine-grained forward security within each time period.
Model
Here we formally define the notion of fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme. Our model resembles the definitions of forward-secure signature scheme by Bellare and Miner [2] . The main difference is that instead of only considering time periods we also take into account the order of signatures in time.
First we describe the ingredients of fine-grained key-evolving signature schemes and then define their forward security.
Definition 1 Let k be a security parameter, I the maximal amount of signatures that can be made per time period, and T the maximal amount of timeperiods. A fine-grained key-evolving signature scheme consists of the following four procedures.
KG(k, I, T ).
The key generation algorithm takes as input k, I, and T and outputs a public key PK and an initial secret key SK (0,0) . Upd(SK (t,i) ). The (time-period) update algorithm takes as input the current secret key SK (t,i) and outputs the secret key SK (t+1,0) for the next timeperiod. Sig(m, SK (t,i) ). On input a message m ∈ {0, 1} * and the current secret key SK (t,i) , this algorithm outputs either a signature (t, i, σ) and a new secret key SK (t,i+1) , or the symbol ⊥. Ver(PK, m , (t , i , σ )). On input a public key PK, a message m and a candidate signature (t , i , σ ) the verification algorithm outputs either 1 or 0.
A useful signing algorithm outputs ⊥ only exceptionally, e.g., if all T timeperiods have passed, or if the maximum amount of I signatures (per timeperiod) were already made. Note that each signature carries a unique index (t, i).
Definition 2 (Validity of Signatures) A signature (t, i, σ) on a message m is considered valid if Ver(PK, m, (t, i, σ)) = 1 and t is not a future time period. However, if the signer revoked the public key w.r.t. the signature index i in time-period t , then additionally either t < t or i < i ∧ t = t must hold.
Let ∆ R be the extra time allowed to the signer and certification authority to process a revocation. Note that the validity of a signature is definitely determined only when the time period t plus an extra time margin ∆ R has passed.
We extend the notion of adaptively chosen message attacks [13] to fine-grained forward-secure schemes. Consider the following games with an adversary.
Game 1 First, the key generation algorithm is run and the public key is sent to the adversary. Next, the adversary can ask for signatures on arbitrary messages. Let M denote the set of all messages which the adversary asked to sign and denote (m (t,i) , (t, i, σ (t,i) )) the resulting message-signature pairs. If the adversary announces that he brakes in, he is handed the current secret key SK (t A ,i A ) , where t A and i A are the current indices, and the game ends. The game ends as well, if all time-periods have passed in which case we set t A := T and i A := I. After the game has ended, the adversary is required to output a message m and a signature (t , i , σ ). The adversary wins the game if the conditions Ver(PK, m , (t , i , σ )) = 1, m ∈ M and either t < t A or t = t A ∧ i < i A hold 3 .
Definition 3 (Security) A fine-grained key-evolving signature scheme (KG, Upd, Sig, Ver) is said to provide security if there exists no polynomial-time adversary who wins Game 1 with probability that is non-negligible in k.
It should now be clear from Definition 3/Game 1 that the signer can maintain the validity of all the signatures made up to the point when the secret key gets compromised, and not only those made in prior time-periods.
A user can revoke her public key by signing a so-called revocation message and sending it to the certification authority. The revocation message must include indices t and i defining that the key leakage occurred during the t-th time period after the i-th message was signed. The certification authority verifies that this signed revocation message was issued during the current time period and then publishes it. Alternatively, the certification authority can time-stamp the revocation message and then publish it. In the latter case, verifiers need to check by themselves, whether the time-stamp corresponds to the appropriate time period. This way a dishonest signer can recall only the signatures made in the current time period (and in the previous one if ∆ R has not yet passed). In case a honest signer has noticed a break-in after the i-th message was signed, he has the possibility to announce the index i (together with time period t) which protects the signatures issued prior to that break-in even during the current time period.
If we do not make such an assumption about existence of a trusted authority, there is no way a (dishonest) signer can be prevented from revoking all the signatures issued.
Technically, signing the revocation message can be done in different ways. One is use a separate signature scheme the keys of which are kept extremely safe and used only very rarely, e.g., only when leakage of keys for fine-grained protocol happens. If one finds it too inconvenient, one could also apply the fine-grained scheme itself to sign its revocation message. In this case it is necessary that we allow the signer to revoke a key several times as otherwise an adversary who knows the secret key could send a revocation message with an index i that is higher than the signer's current index i. Obviously, in the second scenario we assume that a proper revocation message is the one announcing the lowest message index (t, i). However, this solution has the drawback that the fine-grained property is lost, as the adversary can invalidate all signatures of the current time period (or also the previous one if the ∆ R has not passed yet.
3 Fine-Grained Forward-Secure Signature Schemes With A Single Time Period
In this section we provide fine-grained forward-secure schemes which allow for one time period only; thus a dishonest signer could recall all the signatures he made with it. These schemes, however, are not our final ones but rather form the basis for the schemes we construct in the following sections.
In principle, a fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme with a single time period can be obtained from any ordinary forward-secure signature scheme S by abandoning the fixed time periods: to sign the i-th message m, one uses the i-th time-period's secret key of S, and then updates the secret-key of S.
In fact, using the scheme obtained by applying the MMM construction [5] to the Schnorr signature scheme [7] in this way gives a pretty efficient finegrained forward-secure signature scheme with a single time-period. However, it is provably secure only in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, applying the MMM construction to any of the known signature schemes that are provably secure in the strict sense yields no efficient fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme. This is because we now sign only one message per time period and therefore signing does include running the key-generation algorithm of the underlying signature scheme which for here consists of the costly generation of an RSA modulus. One could also use the MMM construction with a one-time signature scheme, which would be more efficient but result in longer signatures. This section is therefore dedicated to efficient fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme with a single time period that are provable secure in the strict sense.
Scheme I: Basic Scheme With A Single Time Period
The scheme we propose in this section is based on the (standard) signature scheme due to Fischlin [14] that is provably secure under the Strong RSA assumption. We obtain forward security by pre-computing some roots that are used to sign a message, deleting the factorization of the modulus after the key generation, and then deleting a pre-computed root after it was used to sign a message. Similar techniques were used in previous forward-secure signature schemes [2] [3] [4] .
Let k and be security parameters. For current security requirements we suggest k = 2000 and = 160. With respect to efficiency, we suggest I = 1024. Let H(·) be a collision-resistant hash function whose output is of size bits, i.e., for any s ∈ {0, 1} * we have 0 ≤ H(s) < 2 . Finally, let QR N denote the subgroup of squares of Z * N .
We now describe the algorithm of our scheme I. Note that because we only allow for a single time period, there is no Upd(·) algorithm.
KG(k, I):
(1) Choose two random safe primes of size about k/2 bits, i.e., primes p and q such that (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are primes as well, and let N = pq be their product. (2) Choose a random seed W and use it with some pseudo-random generator to select I random + 1-bit prime numbers (3) Choose a random element α ∈ R {0, 1} and compute
(4) Update the secret key: computê
and set SK i+1 := (i + 1,ĝ i+1 ,ĥ i+1 ,x i+1 ).
(5) Output the signature (i, (e i , y, α)) 5 and the new secret key SK i+1 .
Ver(PK, m, i, (e , y, α):
If either e is even or e ∈ 2 l (1
holds and 0 otherwise.
Remark 1 In
Step 2 of the Sig algorithm, the value g i can be computed as
by construction. Analogous statements hold for h i and x i . However, this requires O(I) exponentiations to produce a signature which might be far too expensive for many applications. Trading-in a little bit of storage use, a more efficient way to compute these values is to use the pebbling method due to Itkis and Reyzin [4] . We discuss it in §3.1.2.
Theorem 1 Scheme I is a fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme with a single time-period according to Definition 3 if the Strong RSA Assumption holds and the hash function H(·) is collision-resistant.
Much of the proof of this Theorem is similar to the corresponding proofs given by Cramer and Shoup [15] and by Fischlin [14] for their respective ordinary signature schemes.
PROOF. Assume there exists a forger who is allowed to adaptively ask for signatures on messages until some index i A , 0 ≤ i A ≤ I, when he asks to see all the secrets the signer possesses at that time. Finally, the forger outputs a signature on a message m with index < i A that was not signed by the signer with index, i.e., the forger outputs values (e , y, α) and m such that 0 ≤ < i A , 2 (1 +/I) < e < 2 l (1 + ( + 1)/I) and y e = xg α h α⊕H(m)
holds. We now show such a forger cannot exist provided the strong RSA assumption holds, i.e., we show how to solve the flexible RSA problem given such a forger.
We are given an instance (N, z), with z ∈ Z * N , of the flexible RSA problem.
We choose I random unique (l + 1)-bit primes e i ∈ R 2 l (1
) , i = 0, . . . , I − 1 using a random seed W and some pseudo-random number generator.
We draw a random j ∈ R 0, . . . , I − 1.
The plan of our proof is following. We prepare signer's public key with the above primes and sign i A ≤ I messages presented by the forger. Finally the forger asks for the secret key with index i A . All data provided to her must be distributed as in real life. If she outputs a new forged signature (e , y, α) with the index < i A then j = with probability at least 1/I which will allow us to find a nontrivial root of z.
Let us describe the details. Analogously to Fischlin [14] we distinguish two kinds of forgeries: Type II, where e = e j holds and Type III, where e = e j . We consider these two scenarios.
Type II:
Assume that (j, (e j , y j , α j )) will be our signature on m j , we have to guess whether α j = α or α j ⊕H(m j ) = α⊕H(m) will be the case for the adversary's forged signature (j, (e j , y, α)) on m. (Note that H(m j ) = H(m) because m = m j as otherwise it would not be a forged signature.) So we guess that α j = α will happen (the case α j ⊕ H(m j ) = α ⊕ H(m) can be treated similarly, c.f. [14] ). To produce a signer's public key, we choose random v, w ∈ R Z * n , and β ∈ R {0, 1} l and compute
e i , and
We set the public key to (N, g, h, x, W, I). Note that the public key has the same distribution as one that is obtained by the key generation algorithm.
Now we are ready to answer the adversary's queries: To sign a message m i , with 0 ≤ i < I and i = j, we chose α i ∈ R {0, 1} and compute
and to sign the message m j we set α j = β and compute
It is not hard to see that this produces valid signatures having the same distribution as signatures produced by a real signer.
After the adversary has asked for signatures on messages m 0 , . . . , m i A −1 and requests to see the secret key, we computê
es , andx := w
and send her (ĝ,ĥ,x). Now, suppose the adversary stops and outputs a valid signature (, e, y, α) on a message m such that m = m and < i A .
As the adversary could not learn any information about j, with probability at least 1/I we have that = j. We get
and thus
By replacing g and h we finally get
Therefore, we can compute an e j -th root of z (and solve the provided instance) if
holds. First note that |α−α j | < 2 < e j . Furthermore, we know that the prime e j does not divide any e i for i = j. From this (1) follows.
Type III: This case is similar to the Type II case. Here we have e = e i for all 0 ≤ i < I.
We choose random c and d ∈ R Z * N 2 and compute
..,I; e i , x := g c ; , and
We set the public key to (N, g, h, x, W, I). Now, as we can compute e i -th roots of x, g, and h we are ready to answer the adversary's queries on any of m 0 , . . . , m i A −1 . As in the previous case we can also easily compute the secret key SK i A and reveal to the forger.
The adversary stops and outputs a valid signature (j, e , a, y) on a message m. Thus e is an odd number in the interval 2 l (1 + j/I), 2 l (1 + (j + 1)/I) and
Let c = c 1 Φ(N ) + c 2 with 0 ≤ c 2 < φ(N ). Then clearly forger has almost no information about c 1 . Now let p 0 be a prime factor p 0 of e . As p 0 φ(N ) the forger has almost no information about c mod p 0 . Therefore with probability at least 1/2 we have e (c + α + (α ⊕ H(m)) d).
As gcd e , φ(N )2 i=1,...,I e i = 1 we can compute a non-trivial root of z and again solve the provided instance of the flexible RSA Problem.
If the success probability of the forger is , then the success probability of our reduction is 1 2I
. 2
When we later use this scheme as a building block, the RSA modulus N and even the prime exponents e 0 , . . . , e I−1 are given to the key generation algorithm as an input. This, however, does not compromise the security of the scheme as long as N and the exponents e 0 , . . . , e I−1 have been chosen from appropriately. For instance, the same exponents and N can be used with different g, h, and x.
Efficiency Analysis.
We assume that evaluating a hash function takes O(l 2 ) bit-operations (of course only on inputs of reasonable size), multiplying an a-bit and a b-bit number takes O(ab) bit-operations, and raising a number to power of size b-bits over a modulus of size a-bits takes O(a 2 b) bit-operations.
Most of our analysis will concern the standard version of our Scheme I. We will also comment an option when the RSA modulus and the prime exponents are set by some higher level protocol.
Key Generation. Here we assume that generating a k/2-bit prime requires time O (k/2) 5 / log 2 (k/2) which is not proven, but widely accepted.
We need to compute:
• I distinct primes of size l + 1: O(I 4 / log ) bit operations if we assume that we need O( ) trials in each interval of width 2 /I before finding a prime • g :=ĝ 1≤i≤I e i and analogously h and x: as we know the factorization of N = pq we can first compute the product e := e 0 . . . e I−1 mod
We note that in some applications the modulus N can be given to the key generation algorithm as an input. In that case computing g, h, and x requires O(Ilk 2 ) bit operations. Also, if the prime exponents are part of an input, we obviously do not need to (re-)generate them.
Public Key Size. It is easy to verify that the public key has 4k + |W | + log 2 I + 1 bits. W.l.o.g. we can assume that the size of the random seed is l.
Note that the seed W does not have to be a part of the public key.
Secret Key Size. By inspection it is 3k + log 2 I + 1. If we assume that prime exponents are kept in memory instead of being regenerated each time that amounts to (I − i)(l + 1) bits.
Signing. Computing g i :=ĝ
i<j≤I e j i−1 requires (I − i) exponentiations with an (l + 1)-bit exponent and re-computations of prime exponents, which is O (I( k 2 + 4 / log )) bit operations. If we assume that prime exponents are kept in memory the running time of signing is O(I k 2 ).
Signature Size. By inspection it is k + 2l + 1 bits.
Verifying. It needs one application of the hash function H() and three exponentiations with (l + 1)-bit exponents over k-bit RSA modulus. That requires time O(lk 2 ).
More Efficient Signing Using Pebbling
While signing one needs to compute roots g i := g 1/e i , where g =ĝ 0≤j<I e j 0 . Also, one needs to consecutively erase the roots of g after employing them to sign.
A straightforward way to do this is following. Letĝ =ĝ i where g =ĝ . This however is quite expensive in terms of computation.
Itkis and Reyzin [4] proposed the so called pebbling algorithm which allows one to compute such roots efficiently at the expense of additional secure storage space. Their main idea is that instead of computing e i -th root of g each time almost from scratch, one stores several roots of form g 1/ j=i min ..imax e j and employs them in order to compute e i -th root more efficiently. This is done in a way such that "used" roots are erased, so that the forward-security property is not compromised.
Essentially, the pebbling algorithm keeps a number of elements in memory, each of them with four indices. Two of these indices i min and i max define that a particular element should store the j=i min ..imax e j -th root of g. One step in the pebbling algorithm corresponds to one exponentiation with an (l+1)-bit exponent.
By [4, Theorem 3] , to compute an e i -th root of g we need at most 1+log 2 (I −i) single exponentiations only. Furthermore, the pebbling algorithm requires at most (1 + log 2 (I − i)) elements in memory, each of them consisting from 4 integer indices from the interval [0, . . . , I] and a number from Z N . The precomputation phase requires O(I) steps.
We discuss below how the parameters of our basic signature scheme are affected by the pebbling algorithm and present improvements applicable to our particular case.
Signing. By the properties of the pebbling algorithm we need 1 + log 2 (I − i) single exponentiations with an (l + 1)-bit exponent and re-computations of those prime exponents. That requires O(log(I)( k 2 + 4 / log l)) bit operations.
If we assume that prime exponents are kept in memory, we obtain O(log(I)lk 2 ) time of signing.
Secret Key Size. The pebbling algorithm requires to store at most (1 + log 2 (I − i)) elements in memory. With each element we associate 4 indices. As we run the pebbling algorithms to compute roots of g, h and x, the size of secret key is at most (1 + log 2 (I − i)) (3k + 4 log 2 I + 4) bits.
Key Generation. Apart from the ordinary key generation, whose complexity was studied in the previous subsection, we need to run the pre-computation phase of the pebbling algorithm. In particular, we are assuming that the prime exponents are not recomputed during the pebbling pre-computation phase because they were constructed or given at the previous stage of key generation. First we show a simple technical result. However, as during the standard key generation for our Scheme I we know the factorization of the modulus N = pq, we can use it in the pre-computation phase of the pebbling algorithm. This speeds up the pebbling pre-computation to O(Ikl + log(I)k 3 ) bit-operations.
Example with Concrete Parameters. Assume k = 2000, I = 1024 and l = 160. Then the size of public key and signature is respectively 8170 and 2321 bits. Presuming that pebbling was used the size of secret key would be at most 66 440 bits. If we would like to keep in memory I − i of 161-bit prime exponents they would occupy at most 164 864 bits.
Concerning generating (l + 1)-bit prime exponents, by analysis and empirical tests of Cramer and Shoup [15] we know that computational cost of generating a 161-bit prime is not very high. On average this corresponds to about the cost of one exponentiation with a 1024-bit exponent and a 1024-bit RSA modulus.
Scheme II: One-Period Flat-Tree Scheme
Starting from our Scheme I, we now build a more efficient fine-grained forwardsecure signature scheme with only one period. We achieve a much faster key generation and we can avoid regenerating primes because here we need less primes, so that it may become affordable to retain them in memory. Still, this scheme is not the final solution but just a building block for protocols presented in the following sections.
We recall the idea of flat authentication trees (see e.g., [16] [17] [18] ). Let us construct a tree of degree I 0 and depth d − 1. Each node of the tree is going to be associated with a different instance of our Scheme I with the maximal number of signatures equal to I 0 . For the sake of simplicity and efficiency we use the same RSA modulus N and the same primes e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e I 0 −1 in all these instances, and only choose different random elements x, g, and h for each of these instances. For each internal node, the associated scheme is used to authenticate the public keys of the schemes of its children. As each leaf's scheme allows us to sign I 0 messages we can sign I = I d 0 messages in total.
The scheme we just described can be regarded as the iterated product composition from [5] applied to our Scheme I. The scheme's security thus follows the properties of the iterated product composition [5] and the security of Scheme I. However, it is not difficult to prove the scheme secure starting from first principles (c.f. also [16] [17] [18] ).
We note that there is no need to store information about the schemes associated with all nodes in the tree. It is sufficient to keep in memory the information related to signature schemes at the nodes on the path from the root to the actual leaf of the authentication tree.
The instances of our basic scheme at the leaf nodes should use the pebblingmethod to improve performance of signing. However, this is not necessary for the internal nodes of the authentication tree as there computing roots can be distributed to the signing with the schemes associated with the children of the nodes such that the signing cost increases only insignificantly.
Key Generation. We choose a random RSA modulus N and (l+1)-bit primes e 0 , . . . , e I 0 −1 with e i ∈ R 2 l (1 +
) . For each node of the leftmost path in the tree we initiate an instance of Scheme I with the same modulus N and the primes e 0 , . . . , e I 0 −1 number of signatures set to I 0 . We sign each public key on the path to the leaf. We initiate also pebbling scheme for the scheme on the leaf node. That amounts to O 2(
If the scheme is initiated with a given modulus N and primes e 0 , . . . , e I 0 −1 we cannot assume that we know the factorization of N . Therefore, the complexity of key generation becomes O (dI 0 lk 2 ).
Public Key. The public key is the public key of the instantiation of the basic scheme associated with the root which amounts to 4k + + log 2 I + 1 bits.
Signature. The signature consists from an authentication path from the root to the actual leaf node, so it corresponds to d signatures and d − 1 public keys of the Scheme I. That is
Verification. It requires d verification procedures of Scheme I, so verification takes time O(d k 2 ).
Signing and Secret Key Size. On the leaf level d−1 we have the pebbling algorithm running while signing. That takes time O(log(I 0 )( k 2 + 4 / log )) and space at most (1 + log 2 I 0 )(3k + 4 log 2 I 0 + 4) bits. On top levels 0, . . . , d − 2 we are not using pebbling as the effort to compute roots for any of those schemes can be distributed into I 0 steps when we are using a respective lower level signature scheme. That requires performing at most 3 additional exponentiations per signing operation and storing in memory additional 3 group elements of size k for each scheme on top levels 0, . . . , d − 2 on the authentication path from root to the leaf. That amounts to O( 4 / log + k 2 ) bit-operations and O(dk) bits of memory.
Furthermore, while signing we can already generate keys for each of the levels 1, . . . , d − 1 for the next respective signature scheme on that level. For levels 1, . . . , d − 2 that adds 3 exponentiations per local signing operation and 6 group elements per local scheme. Concerning the bottom level d − 1, we can precompute the pebbling values for next instance of the signature scheme while signing, which can be done with a constant number (at most 6) of exponentiations per signature. That amounts to O(log(I 0 )( k 2 + 4 / log )) bit operations (or O(log(I 0 ) k 2 ) if the prime exponents e 0 , . . . , e I 0 −1 are known) and secret key of size at most 2(1 + log 2 I 0 )(3k + 4 log 2 I 0 + 4) + O(dk).
If prime exponents are kept in memory instead of being regenerated each time that requires additional I 0 (l + 1) bits.
Concrete parameters. Suppose that we want to sign at most I = 2 32 messages. Let the security parameters be k = 2000 and = 160. Then we can set I 0 = 2 8 = 256 and d = 4. For storing 256 prime numbers we need 41 216 bits which can be acceptable. Therefore we wouldn't have to recompute the primes. The signature occupies 2000 · 13 + 4 · 321 = 27 284 bits of memory and the secret key will be approximately of size at most 170 000 bits (plus 41 216 bits for prime numbers).
An Ordinary Forward-Secure Signature Scheme
In this section we construct a new ordinary forward-secure signature scheme from Scheme I. Our new scheme has a much faster secret-key update time than previously known ones that are secure without assuming random oracles while the signing-time is about the same.
Given any fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme F for a single time period (such as the ones put forth in the previous section) and some ordinary signature scheme S, one can build an ordinary forward-secure signature scheme F as follows. The public key of F is generated by running the key generation of F . Furthermore, each signature index i of F is assigned to the i-th timeperiod of F . When time period t starts, the key generation algorithm of S is run and the thereby-obtained public key P t of S is signed with F using signature index t. Let us denote this signature by σ t . Thus, the signature on message m that is produced in time period t consists of P t , σ t , and the signature on m produced with S using the secret key corresponding to P t . This construction can be seen as the product composition [5] of F and S. Now, let F be Scheme I provided in §3 (with pebbling), let S be the CramerShoup signature scheme [15] . The efficiency analysis of the so obtained F follows from the efficiency analysis done in the previous section. We compare it with the efficiency of the scheme obtained by applying the MMM construction to the Cramer-Shoup signature scheme, which was hitherto the most efficient forward-secure signature scheme provably secure without assuming random oracles. It is not hard to see that signing time for both schemes is the same, i.e., essentially the time of signing a message with the Cramer-Shoup signature scheme. The secret-key update time of our scheme is dominated by one generation of Cramer-Shoup keys. We have realised that in case of MMM scheme it is Ω(log t) key generations of S on average, where t is the number of time periods used so far. This is less efficient than the constant number of key generations as is claimed in [5] . This error in the analysis of the MMM scheme was also noticed by the authors of that scheme [19] .
Under usually satisfiable conditions on the maximal number of time periods T , our key generation is also faster. More precisely, for our scheme it includes one key generation of S and preparing the keys for F . In the MMM scheme, the main effort in key generation is to initialize l signature schemes S. As long as T l 3 / ln l <
and T <
our construction is going to be faster than the MMM scheme with respect to the key generation. For example, if k = 2000, l = 160, and T = 1024 then key generation for MMM would require approximately 2 52 bit operations as opposed to approximately 2 45 bit operations for our scheme.
Secret key size is at most (1 + log 2 (T )) (3k + 4 log 2 (T ) + 4) + (3k + l + 1) + k = k(3 log 2 T + 7) + log 2 T (4 log 2 T + 5) + l + 5 bits in our protocol. A simple straightforward implementation of MMM needs O(k + l(log t + log l)) bits of secret storage. If we require a fast worst-case update time that results (by our analysis and also [19] ) in O(k log 2 t) bits of secret storage.
Fine-Grained Forward-Secure Signature Schemes
We now discuss ways to build full fledged fine-grained forward-secure signature schemes from any fine-grained forward-secure signature schemes with at least a single time period, e.g., the schemes presented in §3. All our constructions have the property that if the underlying scheme is provably secure without assuming random oracles then so is the resulting scheme.
A Two-Level Scheme
In this section we apply the ideas of the authentication-tree signatures schemes to construct a fine-grained forward-secure scheme. It turns out that the most efficient way to do this is a tree of depth two. While the construction is generic, the most efficient solution is to use our one-period flat-tree scheme (Scheme II) for authenticating the public keys of the signature scheme of the second level, where our basic scheme (Scheme I) is employed. For simplicity, we call the scheme used on the first layer the A-scheme and the one used for the second layer the B-scheme.
Each index of the A-scheme corresponds to a time-period, i.e., index i denotes the time period T i from t 0 + i · t ∆ to t 0 + (i + 1)t ∆ , where t 0 is the starting time and t ∆ is the duration of the time periods. The public key of this scheme becomes the public key of A-scheme. Then, for each time-period T i we use an instance of B-scheme and sign its public key using the A-scheme using index i. After this, the secret key of the A-scheme is updated and its current index is set to i + 1.
To sign the j-th message of the current time period T i , we use the B i -scheme with index j. The signature on the message consist of this signature, the public key of the B i -scheme, and the signature on this public key made with the Ascheme. Again, after signing the secret key of the B i scheme is updated and new current index is j + 1.
Let us turn our attention to revocation. We remind the reader that a parameter ∆ R is published that indicates the time allowed to the user to recognize that the secret key got compromised and to react upon this. Now, whenever a signer wants to revoke her key w.r.t. index j and time-period T i , she (authentically) sends the TTP a message indicating this. The TTP checks whether T i denotes the current time period or whether less time than ∆ R has passed since the period T i ended. If this is the case the TTP accepts the revocation and publishes j and T i appropriately.
A user's signature with indices i and j is considered valid if no revocation happened, or if a revocation w.r.t. indices i and j happened (where i and j are the smallest indices published by the TTP), if i < i or i = i and j < j holds.
Efficiency
We have I d 0 time periods and at most I 0 messages per time-period. To this end we assume that the parameter I 0 is reasonably small so that the I 0 prime numbers (I 0 (l + 1) bits) can be stored by the signer. Otherwise they would have to be generated on-line. We are reusing here the same RSA-modulus for all our one-period schemes.
PK size 4k + log 2 I 0 + log 2 d + 2 SK size 4(1 + log 2 I 0 )(3k + 4 log 2 I 0 + 4) We now show how to improve the key update operation at the end of each time period for our construction based on Schemes I and II. The cost O( k 2 I 0 ) is related with generating a new instance of Scheme I when a new time-period begins. We can amortize it as follows. Assume that we sign at most I 0 /2 messages per time period. Instead of generating a new Scheme I at the end of each time-period, we do it only if at least its I 0 /2 indices were already used. Otherwise, we keep the same Scheme I (in particular its present secret key) and sign its public key with a new index of Scheme II appropriate for a new time-period. This way we know that we generate a new Scheme I only if we signed at least I 0 /2 times. Therefore we can distribute generating the keys of an instance of Scheme I onto I 0 /2 steps. That results in the same order of cost of signing (O( k 2 log I 0 ) bit operations and secret key of size 5(1 + log 2 I 0 )(3k + 4 log 2 I 0 + 4) + I 0 (l + 1) + O((d + 1)k) bits. This reduceds the cost of key update to only O( k 2 log I 0 ) bit operations.
Using a Public Archive
The idea here is to replace the A-scheme in the previous solution with a public archive. We assume that it's not possible to delete messages from the archive and that messages are published together with the exact time they were received by the archive. Given such an archive, one can realize a finegrained forward-secure signature scheme using only one instance of our oneperiod flat-tree scheme as follows (one could use our basic scheme or any other one-period fine-grained forward-secure signature).
A signature on m is made with our one-period flat-tree scheme (Scheme II) using the current index. After having signed, the secret key is updated. At the end of each time period, the user signs a pre-determined message (e.g., "last index used in time period T i ") with the using the current index, say j, and then updates the secret key and sends this index signature to the public archive. The public archive posts the message along with the time it received the signature. Now, whenever a signer wants to revoke her key w.r.t. index j and time-period T i , she sends the TTP a message indicating this. The TTP checks whether either T i is the current time period or less than ∆ R time has passed since T i has ended and whether j is not smaller than the index j of the index signature the signer put in the public archive for the time period T i −1 . If all these checks succeed, the TTP publishes j and T i .
In this solution, a user's signature with index j is considered valid if no revo-cation happened, or if revocation happened, if j < j , where j is the smallest index of any revocation signatures published by the TTP.
Efficiency
PK size 4k + log 2 I 0 + log 2 Upd time essentially no computation For concrete parameters, the sizes of public key, secret key and signature 8011, at most 170 000 + 2 8 · 161 ≈ 211 000 and 26676 bits, respectively.
Allowing s Signatures Per Time-Period
In this solution a single instance of a one-period fine-grained forward-secure signature scheme is sufficient as well. The idea is to bind the signature indices to time-periods by allowing exactly s signatures per time-period. The parameter s (together with t 0 and t ∆ ) needs to be published as part of the public key. Thus, in time-period T i , the indices is, . . . , (i + 1)s − 1 can be used to sign.
To revoke her public key w.r.t. index j the user sends a message indicating this to the TTP. The TTP publishes the index j if it matches the current time-period or if it matches the prior time-period and less time that ∆ R has passed since the end of it. A signature with index j is considered valid if no revocation happened or, in case a revocation w.r.t. index j was done, if j < j holds.
The rational behind this proposal is that the main work of signing a message actually consists of the secret-key update. Thus, one could calculate how many signatures one can possibly issue during a time period given the computational power one has and then set s to this number. Then, one would constantly perform the secret key update, even if no message was signed. This approach would not change the response behavior of the system very much, but it does not require a public archive. Moreover it contains only one level with a single-period fine-grained protocol which in particular implies that after each time period its update would be very fast.
From the practical point of view we comment that this scheme is for instance suitable for servers devoted only to signing. In that case performing operations often even without actually signing a document is acceptable as it is supposed to be the only application running on such server. Furthermore, on the security side, employing a server only for one important service is apropriate.
Efficiency
Here we have at most I Let d = 4. Then, the sizes of public key, secret key and signature are 8008, at most 170 000 + 2 8 · 161 ≈ 211 000 and 26676 bits, respectively.
